![]() The ACLU submitted an amicus brief urging the Court to invalidate the law as unconstitutional and focusing on the breadth of the government's argument. law prohibited hunting, even if the pictures or videos were taken in a jurisdiction where hunting was legal and portrayed the killing of an animal but not its torture or mutilation. In particular, he noted that the statute on its face would criminalize the sale of hunting magazines or videos in the District of Columbia because D.C. Applying traditional First Amendment analysis, the Court then concluded that the statute's reach included a substantial amount of protected speech. The Chief Justice described that proposition as "startling and dangerous," explaining that "he First Amendment's guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of social costs and benefits." Id. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts began by rejecting the government's claim that the speech at issue was unprotected by the First Amendment because its value was outweighed by its social cost. ![]() 1577 (April 20, 2010)(8-1), the Court struck down a federal statute criminalizing depictions of "animal cruelty" as substantially overbroad. Justice Sotomayor wrote the Court's opinion. 8, 2010)(9-0), the Court ruled that bankruptcy lawyers qualify as "debt relief agencies" under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, that the Act constitutionally prohibits "debt relief agencies" from advising creditors to incur more debt prior to filing for bankruptcy, and that the mandatory disclosure requirements of the Act are consistent with the First Amendment because they are reasonably related to the government's legitimate interest in regulating potentially misleading commercial speech. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief urging the Court to narrowly confine any restrictions on corporate speech if it reaffirmed Austin, which the Court did not do. In particular, he criticized the majority for disregarding stare decisis, equating corporate speech with individual speech for First Amendment purposes, and underestimating the corrupting influence of large corporate expenditures on political decision-making. Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy dissent in which he disputed each of the majority's contentions. Finally, the majority held that the disclaimer and disclosure requirements that apply to independent expenditures under current law, and that the Court upheld by an 8-1 vote, were a more narrowly tailored response to the government's asserted interest in shareholder protection. He then rejected the anti-corruption rationale offered by the government on the ground that the Court had never found independent expenditures corrupting. Citing Buckley for the proposition that the government's interest in leveling the playing field does not justify restrictions on speech, he held that the government could not ban corporate campaign speech to prevent the distorting influence of corporate wealth. Applying strict scrutiny, Justice Kennedy rejected each of the justifications offered in support of the corporate speech ban as constitutionally inadequate. He therefore concluded that restrictions on corporate campaign speech abridge core First Amendment values and trigger strict scrutiny. ![]() (Both corporations and unions are allowed to make such expenditures under existing law if they use a PAC.) Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy began with the proposition that the First Amendment generally disfavors speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker. 652 (1990), and the relevant portion of McConnell v. 21, 2010) (5-4), a deeply divided Court ruled that the federal ban on independent campaign expenditures by corporations is unconstitutional, overruling Austin v.
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